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I. INTRODUCTION
In its White Paper Program advocating the removal of all remaining
internal barriers in the Common Market by 1992,1 the Commission for
the European Communities ("Commission") expressed a need for har-
monizing the laws of the Member States on takeover bids and announced
that it would be bringing forward a proposal for a directive on this sub-
ject. Urged by the European Parliament2 and after consultations with
experts from Member States and interest groups, the Commission
adopted the Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company
Law concerning takeover and other general bids (the "Proposal" or
"proposed Directive"). 3 Before this text enters into force, it will have to
be adopted by the Council of the European Communities in cooperation
with the European Parliament and following consultation with the Eco-
nomic and Social Committee.' After such adoption, Member States will
have to enact or modify their existing legislation to comply with the pro-
posed Directive.5 Takeovers are one of the areas not yet covered in the
* B.A., 1984, University of Bilbao; M.P.A., 1986, Hochschule f'dr Verwaltungswissenschaften
Speyer. European Commission (Directorate General for Financial Institutions and Company Law).
1 Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the European Council,
COM(85)310 final (June 14, 1985)[hereinafter White Paper].
2 Resolution of Feb. 11, 1988.
3 COM(88)823 final (Dec. 22, 1988).
4 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 26, 38,
art. 54.
5 Id. art. 189, at 79.
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program of company law coordination6 under Article 54 of the Treaty of
Rome. The proposed Directive attempts to provide shareholders and
other interested parties equivalent standards of protection before the law
in all the Member States. Accordingly, this Proposal does not deal with
competition policy aspects on a European level which will be primarily
governed by the merger control draft regulation7 now under discussion in
the Council of Ministers.
In England and the United States, the terms "merger" and "take-
over bid" are often used interchangeably. It is true that a takeover bid is
often economically the equivalent of a merger. They are both examples
of concentration or amalgamation of companies. Legally, however,
mergers and takeover bids are quite different.8 In a merger, which is
sometimes also called an "assets merger" or "legal merger", all of the
assets and liabilities of one or more companies are transferred either to
an existing company or a newly-formed company. The company or com-
panies being acquired are wound up without going through the liquida-
tion procedure, and their shareholders receive shares in the acquiring or
the newly-formed company.9 A takeover bid, also referred to as a
"tender offer" in the United States, is generally understood to mean an
offer of cash or new securities in exchange for securities that have voting
rights in a company or are convertible into securities carrying such rights
(i.e., shares, convertible bonds, subscription rights, options and war-
rants). The purpose of the offer usually is to acquire control of the com-
pany or to consolidate the offeror's existing control. Thus, the offer is
made conditional upon a transfer to the offeror of a sufficient number of
shares to achieve the offeror's objective. Unlike the case of a merger, a
takeover does not involve the winding up of one of the companies or the
transfer of its assets and liabilities to the acquiring company. The com-
pany whose shares are acquired remains in existence.
6 To date, the coordination has covered requirements relating to the following: disclosure, 11
O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 65) 8 (1968)[hereinafter 1st Company Law Directive]; formation and
capital, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 26) 1 (1977)[hereinafter 2nd Company Law Directive]; annual
and consolidated accounts, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 222) 11 (1978)[hereinafter 4th Company
Law Directive]; 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 193) 1 (1983)[hereinafter 7th Company Law Directive];
qualifications of auditors, 27 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 126) 20 (1984)[hereinafter 8th Company Law
Directive]; legal mergers, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 295) 36 (1978)[hereinafter 3rd Company Law
Directive]; and split-ups, O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 378) 82/891 (1982)[hereinafter 6th Company
Law Directive]. Further proposals are being negotiated in Community institutions.
7 COM(88)734 final-revised version (Nov. 30, 1988).
8 This is why mergers and takeover bids are dealt with in two different EC-Company Law
Directives.
9 3rd Company Law Directive, supra note 6, arts. 3, 4.
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II. THE SITUATION IN MEMBER STATES
Unlike mergers, which have been taking place in most European
countries since at least the 1930s, takeover bids have only emerged in the
last thirty years. In addition, takeover bids vary in frequency from coun-
try to country. These factors explain why Member States differ with re-
spect to their regulations, the practice of takeover bids, and in particular
the feasibility of contested takeovers.
A. Member States' Regulations on Takeover Bids
Some Member States have specific regulations for takeover bids.
Others, such as Denmark and Greece, have no relevant legislation be-
cause takeover bids are practically unknown in these countries. Among
Member States having specific regulations, the type of rules varies. Some
have legal standards (Spain, 0° France," and Portugal"), while in
Belgium and Luxembourg the transactions are carried out according to
the jurisprudence laid down by successive approaches by competent au-
thorities.13 There are codes of conduct in Germany,' 4 Italy, 15 the
Netherlands,' 6 and the United Kingdom' 7 (whose code also applies in
Ireland in some cases'"). Although in the United Kingdom the City
Code on Takeovers and Mergers does not have the force of law, it is
enforced indirectly especially since the adoption of the Financial Services
Act of 1986. Furthermore, the financial institutions and other in-
termediaries acting on behalf of the parties to a bid are subject to sanc-
tions imposed by their regulatory organizations for breaches of the City
Code.
Member States' takeover regulations also diverge considerably on
such questions as: the scope of application, the obligation to launch an
offer, the control of the offer, the procedure of launching an offer, and an
offer's effects. The scope of application of takeover regulations in most
10 Ley reguladora del mercado de valores of Jul. 28, 1988, art. 60 and 61; Real Decreto 279/
1984 of Jan. 25, 1984.
11 In particular R6glement G6n6ral du Conseil des Bourses de Valeurs of Aug. 1988, art. 178-
206-1. The Conseil G6n6ral des Bourses de Valeurs (stock exchange council) recently approved new
rules which are subject to the approval of the Finance Minister acting on the advice of the Commis-
sion des Op6rations de Bourse and the Banque de France.
12 Codigo das Sociedadas Comerciais of Sept. 2, 1986, art. 306-315.
13 The Commission Bancaire in Belgium and the Institut Mon6taire in Luxembourg.
14 Leitsitze der Biirsensachverstlindigenkommission of 1979. This Article will use "Germany"
to refer exclusively to the Federal Republic of Germany.
15 Code of Conduct of the Milan Stock Exchange of 1972.
16 Code of Conduct of the Social and Economic Council of 1975.
17 City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (last revision Jan. 26, 1988).
18 Where the offeree is a company quoted on the Dublin or Cork stock exchanges.
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Member States includes only transactions concerning companies listed
on stock exchanges. However, the United Kingdom's code regulates
takeovers involving both listed and unlisted public companies and some
private companies that have been somehow connected with the stock ex-
change19 in the ten years prior to their acquisition. Obligation to launch
takeover offers apply in the United Kingdom, Portugal, and Spain under
certain circumstances, normally when a certain level of participation is
reached.2" Also, in the United Kingdom, partial offers are not allowed.
This means that the United Kingdom prohibits offers in which the of-
feror has reached the 30% threshold and decides to acquire less than all
the remaining shares of the target company. Spanish law requires a total
bid when someone has acquired 50% of the capital of the target
company.
The control exercised by the relevant authorities over takeover bids
differs among Member States as well. In some Member States, the offer
must be approved by the competent authority before it is published.2" In
others, such as Portugal, there is ex-post control of already published
bids. In addition, some Member States mandate certain procedures to
launch a bid. Belgium, Spain, and France require the offeror to an-
nounce its intentions to launch an offer first to the competent authorities.
In the United Kingdom, Portugal, and the Netherlands, the target com-
pany is to be informed before anyone else. The German Code requires
the offeror to address both the authorities and the target company.
Offers also have different effects in different Member States. In some
countries, e.g., Spain, Belgium, and France, the announcement of a bid
automatically suspends the quotation and trading of the target com-
pany's shares. In the United Kingdom and in France, the offer also pro-
hibits the management of the target company from undertaking any
action that would frustrate the bid, such as raising the share capital or
engaging in any extraordinary transactions such as the disposal of key
assets. In the Netherlands, the management of a company may defend
itself from an unwelcome offer by issuing new shares to friendly share-
holders. Furthermore, there are significant differences among Member
States with regard to the contents of an offer document, its publication
requirements, the conditions under which an offer may be revised, and
the effects of a competing bid on the initial one.
19 City Code on Takeovers and Mergers at A7.
20 Thirty percent of the voting rights of the target company in the United Kingdom, 20% in
Portugal, and 25% of the capital of the target company in Spain.
21 "Nihil obstat" from the Commission Bancaire in Belgium, "d~elaration de recevabilit6" in




In Europe, takeover bids are a phenomenon largely concentrated in
the United Kingdom. However, there have recently been signs that the
number of takeover operations in other Member States has begun to in-
crease. Certainly the best known example in Europe is the hostile bid in
January 1988 for the Soci&6 Grnrrale de Belgique, a holding company
controlling about one-third of the Belgian economy, by the Italian entre-
preneur Carlo de Benedetti.
After the October 1987 crash, France experienced a real "bid
mania" in the early months of 1988. Major companies such as Martell,
B6n6dictine, Rhin-Rh8ne, La Redoute, and especially T6l6m6canique
were involved in takeover battles. One of the main political issues of last
spring involved Schneider's takeover attempt of T6l6mreanique, the
world's third largest producer of industrial automation. T6l6mrcanique
attempted to combat Schneider by seeking help from Framatome. None-
theless, after more than five months, Schneider's bid succeeded.
Most people in Spain had never heard of takeover bids until Novem-
ber 30, 1987, the day Banco de Bilbao decided to acquire Banco Espafiol
de Crrdito ("Banesto"). However, with the support of the Madrid
Stock Exchange, Banesto rejected the bid. The Madrid Stock Exchange
argued that Banco de Bilbao could not offer as consideration unissued
shares whose existence was conditional upon shareholder authorization.
Banco de Bilbao eventually withdrew.2" The reason behind the Madrid
authorities' support of Banesto was related to its position on how Spanish
banks should be restructured before 1992. The Madrid authorities prob-
ably felt that hostile bids are not the correct means for the restructuring
of Spanish banks. Instead, the restructuring should be done through
agreed mergers, such as those currently being used.24
Takeover bids are very likely to increase as capital markets in Eu-
rope are liberalized within the framework of the single European Market.
Although it is difficult to find statistics on the number of takeover bids
that have taken place in the European Community ("Community" or
"EC"),25 one can say that in the United Kingdom there are more than
twice as many takeover bids than in the rest of the Member States taken
22 Cf La OPA del Banco de Bilbao. Documentos y dictimenes juridicos, Banco de Bilbao (ed.),
Madrid 1987.
23 Decision of Dec. 4, 1987.
24 Banesto decided to merge with Banco Central, and Banco de Bilbao with Banco de Vizcaya.
Recently, however, Banesto and Banco Central decided not to proceed with the merger.
25 Most data concerning mergers and acquisitions do not differentiate between takeover bids and
other forms of concentration such as mergers.
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together. In 1987, there were about 260 takeover bids in the United
Kingdom, compared to between ten and twenty-five bids in Belgium,
France and Spain and between one and ten bids in Ireland, Italy, the
Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Germany. Moreover, in 1987, there
were no takeover bids in Portugal, Denmark, or Greece. Takeover bids
in the United Kingdom are distinctive in another way.26 British offerors
seem primarily to target American companies,2 7 while other European
investors prefer acquiring European companies. The following descrip-
tion of the English, French, and German situations will help to account
for these large differences in takeover activity within the European
Community.
1. United Kingdom
The reason for the high frequency of takeovers in the United King-
dom is, above all, its very open and very developed capital market. In
1985 there were 5,500 public companies in England and Wales, 3,000 of
which were traded in the different stock markets.28 Companies in the
United Kingdom, like those in the United States, can raise funds rela-
tively easily on the stock exchange. Consequently, the shares held by the
public are widely dispersed. Companies in the United Kingdom must
meet high transparency standards to provide shareholders with invest-
ment information, and the management of companies cannot tightly con-
trol who its shareholders are. Such companies are thus more vulnerable
to takeovers than are companies financed by banks.
The United Kingdom traditionally views takeover bids as being
something positive, as an application of the principle of equal treatment
of shareholders and the belief that the shareholders should have the final
decision in all matters concerning their company. Furthermore, the
United Kingdom believes that one should not defacto attain corporate
control without enabling all shareholders to sell their shares at an attrac-
tive price. Thus, its code of conduct provides that a shareholder who has
acquired 30% of the voting rights of a company must launch a general
bid.
26 Information given to the Commission by Member States.
27 The value of United Kingdom acquisitions in the United States in 1988 reached $33.5 billion.
Fin. Times, Jan. 18, 1988, at 8, col. X.
28 About 2,500 companies were listed on the Stock Exchange, some 300 were admitted to the
United Securities Market, and about 150 were traded in over-the-counter markets. Cf. BEOG, P.F.C.,




Takeover activity in France rose considerably during 1988. Never-
theless, according to the Commission des Operations de Bourse
("COB")2 9, French companies are less vulnerable to hostile bids than
United Kingdom or United States companies for two reasons. First, the
capital of French companies seems to be less dispersed among the public.
Second, French companies may use a number of legal measures to rein-
force the position of their managements. Companies may acquire up to
ten percent of their own shares. Further, since 1966 the articles of asso-
ciation of a company may grant double voting rights to shares owned by
the same shareholder for at least two years. Companies like Peugeot or
Pernod Ricard have made use of such a possibility.30 In addition, com-
panies may raise capital by issuing investment certificates which do not
give voting rights or preferential rights to dividends to the holders. Fi-
nally, companies may issue investment certificates which grant preferen-
tial rights to dividends but no voting rights. The issuance of such
certificates is limited to twenty-five percent of the capital of a company.
3. Germany
In Germany, takeover bids are practically an unknown phenome-
non. Although since October 1987 a number of companies have been
quoted below their real values at potentially interesting prices, corporate
Germany is still waiting for its first hostile takeover.31 This is due to a
number of factors. First, Germany has relatively underdeveloped stock
markets.32 At the end of 1986, there were 2,190 Aktiengesellschaften
(AG, public limited companies).33 Only 810 of these AG were traded on
one of the German markets.34 Shareholdings are not very widely spread.
There are about 400 public companies with more than 1,000 sharehold-
ers and only nineteen companies35 with more than 100,000. There is no
company with more than 600,000 shareholders.36
29 1987 Paris, COMMISSION DES OPERATIONS DE BOURSE (COB) Rep. 20, 131.
30 Quere, French Poison Pills and Takeover Restrictions, INT'L FIN. L. REv., June 1988, at 11.
31 Cf. Otto, Uberenahmeversuche bei Aktiengesellschaften und Strategien derAbuehr, supp. 12 to
29 DER BETRIEB (July 22, 1988) (An interesting study comparing the situation in Germany and in
the United States as regards defense measures against hostile takeover bids.).
32 There are, however, signs that this situation is changing. See, Sweeping Away Frankfurt's Old-
Fashioned Habits, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 28, 1989, at 77.
33 51, 52 DER BETRIEB 2, 588 (Dec. 18, 1987).
34 3 DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFr R55 (1988).
35 VEBA, Siemens, Volkswagen, Hoechst, Bayer, BASF, Daimler Benz, co op Frankfurt,
Feldmuhle, RWE, Thyssen, VIAG, Mannesmann, Commerzbank, Dresdner Bank, AEG, Nixdorf,
and Hoesch.
36 Supra note 34, at R56.
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Second, in Germany, as in all other Member States of the Commu-
nity, there are a number of company law provisions that allow companies
to adopt measures to ensure that the control of the company remains in
friendly hands.37 For example, the articles of association of a company
may condition the transfer of its shares on the company's approval of the
transfer ("Vinkulierung")". 38 Furthermore, German companies may
limit the number of votes in respect of the shares alotted to one share-
holder. Of the above mentioned nineteen companies which might be in-
teresting targets for a takeover bid, at least seven have introduced
provisions in their articles of association limiting the number of votes
that a single shareholder may exercise to 5% (sometimes 10%) of the
share capital.39
Third, there are relatively few companies with publicly traded stock
in Germany and most of those are financed or controlled by banks. In
1986 there were 348,561 limited liability companies, of which 2,190 were
public companies (AG) and 346,371 were private companies (Gesell-
schaft mit beschrinkter Haftung, GmbH).40 The overwhelming majority
of companies are thus GmbH, which are often family-owned but not nec-
essarily small. For example, Bosch, a very large electronics manufac-
turer, is a GmbH controlled by a foundation (Robert Bosch Stiftung).4"
Also, German banks play a very important role in corporate life.42 They
are important shareholders. For example, Deutsche Bank owns 28% of
Daimler Benz.4 3 Furthermore, shareholders often appoint the banks
where their shares are deposited to represent them at the general meet-
ings of shareholders. Finally, companies are mainly financed by banks
and not by the market.
There are several other reasons why hostile takeover attempts in
Germany are so rare. Company balance sheets, in particular the exist-
ence of hidden reserves, make it sometimes difficult to estimate the value
of a potential target.' The German two-tiered management system cre-
ates a situation where a successful bid does not always automatically give
37 Cf. Hauschka & Roth, Ubernahmeangebote und deren Abwehr im deutschen Recht, in 7 DIE
AKTIENGESELLSCHAFr 181 (1988).
38 Cf Sieveking & Technau, Dos Problem sognenannter "disponsibler stimmrechte" zur
Umgehung der Vinkulierung von Namensaktien, 1 DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 19 (1989).
39 Supra note 34, at R56.
40 Supra note 33.
41 COMMERZBANK, WER GEHORT ZU WEM, 126 (1988).
42 Deutsche Bank, the first German bank, is said to have played a major role in the failure of the
attempted hostile takeover for Feldmiihle-Nobel AG. Cf. 25 DER SPIEGEL 96 (1988).
43 Cf. supra note 41, at 477.
44 This problem is due to be solved partly by the implementation of the 4th and 7th Company
Law Directives into German law. See, supra note 6.
Takeover Bids
9:487(1989)
the bidder full control of the management of the acquired company. Fi-
nally, cross-participations between companies are frequent. A hard core
of friendly and reliable shareholders is an important deterrent to hostile
takeovers.4 5
C. Creating a More Level Playing Field
Against this background, it is clear that the playing field for take-
over bids in the Member States of the Community is very far from level.
Therefore, the Commission has taken a number of measures to ensure
that the conditions under which takeovers are made and the prospects of
their success are equivalent throughout the Community. Most notable
among these measures is the Proposal for a Thirteenth Company Law
Directive.
III. THE PROPOSAL
A more level playing field for takeover bids will generally make such
transactions easier in those Member States in which they are at present
difficult. This should facilitate the restructuring of European industry,
which will be vital in the preparation for 1992. At the same time, the
protection of the shareholders involved in a bid, particularly those of the
offeree company, must be ensured.
The Proposal contains a series of essential rules to guarantee equal
treatment of shareholders. It also sets publicity and transparency re-
quirements and regulates the conditions under which defensive measures
can be adopted once a bid is announced. The Commission has taken
account of the fact that takeovers evolve rapidly and continuously. Rigid
rules would be inappropriate in this context, because supervisory author-
ities must be able to respond rapidly and flexibly to new and unexpected
circumstances. Hence, a national supervisory authority will be empow-
ered with all necessary powers to ensure that the guarantees foreseen in
the Proposal will be respected in each Member State (Article 6).
A. Scope of Application
The proposed Directive applies to all cases where a takeover bid is
launched to acquire the shares of a EC-public limited company, whether
this company is listed or unlisted and whether the offeror is or is not an
EC-national or an EC-compafny. As explained below, a takeover bid
must be launched when someone reaches a certain level of participation
45 See, Peizer, Prophylaktische Verteidigungsstrategien gegen unerwainschite Ubernahmeversuche,
in 13 ZErrSCHRIFT FOR DAS GESAMT KREDrrwEsEN 577 (1988) (presenting an opposing opinion).
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in a company (the "mandatory bid"). A bid can also be launched on a
voluntary basis when no legal obligation exists (the "voluntary bid").
The Proposal applies to both mandatory and voluntary bids.
B. Equality of Treatment
The Proposal lays down a general and fundamental principle of
Company Law, that of the equal treatment of shareholders (Article 3).
Some provisions also apply this principle to particular situations, such as
the obligation to launch a bid when a certain level of participation in a
company is reached (Article 4). Those wishing to acquire shares, which
would give them one-third46 of the total voting rights must launch a
takeover bid. In calculating shareholdings, the voting rights held by cer-
tain persons connected with the offeror must be added to those held by
the offeror himself. These "connected persons" are those who act in
their own name but on behalf of the offeror, who act in concert with the
offeror, those companies belonging to the same group of companies as
the offeror, and any members of the offeror's management bodies.
The threshold of one-third was chosen because, once someone has
reached that level of participation of a company, he may exercise a block-
ing minority. In all Member States, important decisions which have to
be taken by the general meeting of shareholders require a majority of at
least two-thirds of the votes attached to the securities represented. This
rule is imposed by Community Legislation to limit or suppress share-
holders' preferential subscription rights in the case of an increase of the
share capital, for the reduction of capital, for its total or partial writing-
off,47 and for transactions such as mergers4 8 or split ups.49
The proposed Directive obliges the offeror to make a total bid, i.e.,
for all the shares of the company. This system already exists in the
United Kingdom and in Spain, and its introduction is currently being
discussed in France. The aim of this rule is primarily to avoid partial
speculative bids. It also seeks to protect shareholders, who, after a par-
tial bid, would be left in a minority position and would suffer a loss in the
value of their shares.
The total bid requirement may result in certain undesirable conse-
quences in several specific instances. This is in large part due to the fact
that the proposed Directive applies to all cases in which the offeree is an
EC-public limited company, whether the company is quoted or non-
46 Member States may not fix this threshold at more than one-third.
47 2nd Company Law Directive, supra note 6, art. 40.
48 3rd Company Law Directive, supra note 6, art. 7.
49 6th Company Law Directive, supra note 6. art. 5.
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quoted (Article 1). For example, a mandatory offer for stock in certain
companies could lead to costs disproportionate to the size and the value
of the target company. To prevent this situation, the Proposal exempts
an offeror from the mandatory offer requirement when the offeree com-
pany is a small- or medium-sized 50 non-quoted company (Article 5).
Moreover, even if the company to be acquired were a quoted or large
non-quoted public limited company, a mandatory bid could be incompat-
ible with the interests of the shareholders or even with the objectives of
the Proposal. For example, it would be unfair to impose the launching of
a bid on those who have reached the one-third threshold in an uninten-
tional manner (from donations, inheritance, etc.). A national supervi-
sory authority may grant exceptions in such cases, but it must clearly
indicate its reasons and adopt all measures necessary to ensure equal
treatment of shareholders (Article 4(3)).
All shareholders of the target company have to be given equal treat-
ment in respect to the prices they are offered for their shares. If the
offeror buys shares during the acceptance period at a higher price than
that laid down in the offer document or one of its revisions, the offeror
must increase the consideration given to those who have already ac-
cepted the bid (Article 16). Once a bid is launched, it can only be with-
drawn by the offeror under specific circumstances stated in the Proposal
(Article 13).
C. Transparency
Transparency is ensured by a number of provisions of the Propo-
sal.5 1 As soon as someone decides to take either a voluntary or
mandatory bid (even though the details might not be fully worked out),
he must publicly52 announce his intentions (Article 7). The idea behind
this rule is that all information capable of influencing the market should
be made public as soon as possible to reduce the scope for insider dealing.
Transparency is assured particularly by publication of the offer doc-
ument, which contains the conditions of the bid, and by publication of a
report by the management of the target company. The proposed Direc-
tive is very flexible regarding the means of publication of these docu-
ments. They may either be published fully in newspapers or official
50 A company is considered to be "small- or medium-sized" if it does not exceed the limits of
two of the three following criteria: balance sheet total of 6.2 million ECU; net turnover of 12.8
million ECU and average number of employees during the financial year of 250. 4th Company Law
Directive, supra note 6, art. 27.
51 All transparency rules apply to any revisions of a bid and to competing bids.
52 This announcement is published by the same means as the offer document which is mentioned
below.
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gazettes, made available to the addressees of the bid at places announced
publicly, or sent directly to the shareholders (Article 11).
The Proposal also sets out the minimum content of the offer docu-
ment (Article 10). In the interest of all parties to a bid, the offeror must
clearly state in the offer document his intentions concerning the future of
the company. Particularly important are the offeror's intentions regard-
ing the company's activities, the intended use of the company's assets,
and his plans as to the company's management and workers. The offeror
also has to state clearly in the offer document any financing of the bid
that might cause debts to the target company (e.g., leveraged buy outs)
and specify the importance of these future burdens. The authority re-
sponsible for policing bids in a particular Member State, however, may
require additional information in the offer document where necessary.
When a bid is launched simultaneously in several Member States,5 3 the
authority responsible for supervising the content and publication of the
offer document is that of the Member State where the target company
has its registered office. The authorities of all other Member States in-
volved must recognize this offer document (Article 6(3)).
In the report to be prepared and published by the board of the of-
feree company, the board must state its opinion on the bid, including the
arguments for and against acceptance of the bid (Article 14), and
whether the takeover bid is friendly or contested. The report should also
disclose any agreements on the exercise of voting rights attached to the
shares of the target company. The board should provide this report to
the addressees of the bid by the same means as the offer document and
before expiration of the acceptance period.
Price disclosure is an important means of ensuring that all share-
holders of the target company are offered the same price (Article 16).
Consequently, once the bid is announced, the supervisory authorities
must be informed of all acquisitions of securities by holders of 1% or
more of the voting rights in the companies concerned. This obligation
also applies to persons acting in concert with or on behalf of these hold-
ers. The prices at which such transactions were made must also be dis-
closed (Article 17(2)).
Finally, a bid for a company may have serious repercussions for its
employees. Therefore the management of the target company must com-
municate the offer document and its own report to the representatives of
its workers (Article 19).
53 This might be the case if the shares of the offeree company are quoted on the stock exchange




The Proposal only deals with defense measures adopted after a par-
ticular bid has been launched. It does not deal with the numerous de-
fense measures that can be taken by a company when no bid has been
made or is even intended. According to the Proposal, the management
of the offeree company must at all times act in the interests of the com-
pany. Therefore, during the offer period, management cannot undertake
any action that could frustrate the bid, unless the shareholders authorize
it to do so. Examples of prohibited defense measures are issuing new
shares or engaging in exceptional transactions without the supervisory
authority's consent (Article 8). This provision is consistent with the very
concept of a takeover bid, which, by its nature, is directed to the share-
holders of a target company. That is, its aim is-to ensure that the final
decision concerning the bid is made by the shareholders of the target
company.
E. Flexibility
An important reason why so many Member States either have no
regulation concerning takeovers or just codes of conduct is that takeovers
evolve rapidly and rules must be adapted to continuously changing situa-
tions. There is also a danger that the rigid regulation of takeovers might
cause major contested takeovers to be argued and eventually decided in
the courts. As noted above, supervisory authorities must be able to re-
spond with flexibility to new circumstances. The Proposal therefore en-
ables the supervisory authority to grant exceptions to: (1) the obligation
to launch an offer (Article 4(3)); (2) the restriction of the powers of the
management of the offeree to engage in exceptional transactions (Article
8(b)); (3) the respect of certain delays (Articles 12(2) and 15(5)); and (4)
the withdrawal of bids (Article 13(1)(f)).
F. Reciprocity
In the context of takeover bids, reciprocity means that an offeror
from a non-EC country is treated in the same manner as EC offerors are
treated in that non-EC country. Reciprocity is particularly important in
relation to contested takeovers. The defendants of reciprocity claim that
both within and outside the Community, there are countries where it is
relatively easy to acquire a company and others where it is not. This is
an undeniable fact. However, the requirement of a reciprocity treatment
at the Community level would imply that there is homogeneity within
the Community as regards the feasibility of contested takeovers. As
mentioned above, this is not the case. Therefore, the proposed Directive
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does not include a reciprocity clause. Reciprocity instead can operate on
a national level: member States are free to forbid a takeover bid
launched by a non-EC offeror on the ground that its nationals do not
benefit from reciprocal treatment in that country. If a more uniform sit-
uation develops among Member States in the future, a Community-wide
reciprocity policy may then be appropriate.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The Proposal is a very important step towards creating a level play-
ing field for takeovers in the Community. It will ensure equal treatment
of shareholders and a high degree of transparency. Most significantly,
the shareholders of the offeree company will ultimately decide whether a
takeover will take place. There are aspects related to takeovers which
the Proposal does not cover. Some have been ruled by other Community
legislation. For example, the recently adopted Directive on the disclo-
sure of major shareholdings5 4 or the proposed Directive on insider trad-
ing.55 Other uncovered aspects, such as the defense measures companies
may adopt before the announcement of a particular bid, will be the sub-
ject of further Community action.5 6 Nonetheless, the aspects not ad-
dressed by the Proposal do not diminish its significance. Hopefully, the
Council of the European Commission will adopt the Proposal swiftly.
54 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 348) 62 (1988).
55 COM(88)549 final (Oct. 4, 1988).
56 Eg., one by issuing non-voting shares, by limiting the number of voting rights one share-
holder may have, or by any other mechanism used for breaching the principle of proportionality
between the amount of shares held and their voting rights. Cf. Press release of the Commission
Spokesman, No. P153, Dec. 22, 1988, at 4.
